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Introduction

Possibly recognizing that meat-count and shell-size
restrictions have not controlled mortality in a particular
manner,

the New England Fisheries Management Council

(NEFMC> has begun to explore alternative forms of regulations.

In particular,

considered.

restrictions on effort are being

Effort restrictions,

however,

while having

advantages over meat-count and shell-size limitations,
have several problems.

also

This is particularly true if age at

capture and equity are of concern.
ln this note,

a

preliminary overview of the use of

effort restrict ions is preser1ted.
tionally defined,

The concept,

is considered.

as tradi-

Problems with the defi-

nition are subsequently discussed.

Next,

a preliminary

analysis of changes in landings resulting from effort restrict ions oY, New England sea seal lop dredge vessels is
presented.
on a

Last,

problems of imposing effort restrictions

fleet comprised of heterogeneous firms are discussed.

The Concepts of Effort and Effort Restrictions

Effort may be defined as nominal,
effective.

standardized,

or

Nominal effort is a measure of fishing time or

number of operating units (e.g.,
number of drags or trips made)

days-at-sea or fished or

(Treschev,

197S>.

Standar-

dized effort is measured as the product of fishing power,
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adjusted to a reference level,

and fishing time or nominal

effort; all measurements are expressed in terms of the same
The purpose of stan-

unit of measurement or base value.

dardizatio~ is to express effort over different types or
sizes of operating units in terms of the same unit of
measurement.

Eff"ective 'Fishing eff"ort is the percent ot·

the mean population that is caught
marsh,

(Cunningham and Whit-

1980).
Thus,

effort is a measure of the combination of all
That

-Factors or activities by man which influence catch.
is,

effort is a composite input

or grouping together steak cod,
whale cod to simply cod).
-Firm which uses f"uel,
machinery,

(this is the same as adding
market cod,

Consider,

labor,

cod scrod,

for example,

electror-,ics,

ice,

a

fishing

food,

and equipment to harvest and land fish.

and

gear,
A

measure of et·r·ort which al lows ror al 1 these factors
requires standardization to allow for the differences.

The

standardized measure of" of" all the listed t·actors requires
combining all the factors into a single composite measure
of ef"fc,rt.
Kirkley and Strand
have demonstrated,

(1988a,

however,

1988b) and Squires (1987)

that it may r-,ot be possible to

consider the influence of all factors in terms of a single
measure.

This does not rule out the possibility of using

nominal effort or days at sea to analyze the effects of
changes in catch resulting from changes in r-,ominal effort.
It does,

though,

require consideration of all factors in
-2-

any analysis.
In mathematical terms,

the measure of effort as a

composite input is specified as

(1)

Effort= g(fuel,

labor, electronics,

ice,

food,

etc.>

This specif'ication of' effort requires that decisions about
fuel,

labor, electronics,

ice,

food,

machinery,

gear,

and equipment be unrelated to the expected level of catch
and the size of the fish stock.
sary that effort double if all
labor) double.
firms

<e.g.,

In addition,
inputs <e.g.,

it is necesfuel and

These conditions rarely apply to fishing

we typically observe an increase in the crew

size when the fish stock or output price is very high).

Ef'fort. restrictions:
A major purpose of regulating effort is to control
f'ishing mortality (i.e.,

the biomass or number o'f fish

extracted by fishing expressed as a proportion of the mean
population size).

Ef'fort restrict ior,s car, be either active

(direct> or passive (indirect>
1 '982).

effort

(Sissenwine and Kirkley,

Active cor-,trols directly control the level of
(e.g.,

a restriction on days-at-sea>.

Passive con-

trols affect or restrict the components of effort

(e.g.,

type and size of gear and fishing practices>.
In simple terms,
reduce catch.
Overtime,

ef'fort restrictions are intended to

Fishing mortality,

the fish stock

-3-

in turn,

should decrease.

<numbers and/or biomass> should

increase.

This is hypothesized to result in improved

recruitment

<number of fish or biomass added to the

exploitable stock)

and stock size in the future.

Unfortunately,

the link between current levels of

fishing and future stocks sizes is extremely difficult to
determine.

About all that can be shown is that a reduction

in the rate of removal to very low levels will
an increase in the size of future stocks,
rate of removal will

likely cause

or a very large

likely result,. in depressed fish

The eft·ects of control I iY,g mortality or the rate

stocks.

of removal between the extremes is often uncertain.
Consider the following simplified example of how
effort restrictions are intended to work.

Let there be a

catch-effort equation which explains how catch responds to
changes in fishing effort:

(2)

C

=

q E N

where C is catch,
days at sea,
restricted,
constant.
a

result,

q

is a catchability coefficient,

and N is stock size.
catch should fall

Also,

q E or F

As effort

<E>

if stock size and q

Eis

is
is held

(fishing mortality> declines.

As

the existing biomass and spawning stock size

should increase in the future.

The expected net result

an increased exploitable fish stock and biomass in the
future:

<a> E decreases causing C to fall
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is

(b) C decreases causing N to rise
<c> Nt

increases causing Nt.,

(d) N •• ,

where t

increases causing

to rise

c •• ,

to rise

and t+i represent the current and future time

periods.

The bottom line is that

Et

decreases and

Ct+t

increases.
It appears simple and obvious.
work.

If it does work,

Yet,

it may not

what happens along the way?

The

economic benefits or today are being traded ror hopefull
increased economic benerits tomorrow.
erman pays today for a
tomorrow.
Also,

However,

That is,

the fish-

product believed to be available

the product may not be available.

since most fleets are comprised of different size

vessels,

it is quite possible that some vessels must pay

more dearly for future products.

A Preliminary Analysis of Effort Restrictions

In this section,

a

preliminary analysis of control-

ling nominal effort in the New England,
fishery is presented.

sea scallop, dredge

The analysis is based on data

available from the Northeast Fisheries Center,
Marine Fisheries Service.
model

First,

is specified and estimated.

National

an industry catch-effort
Then,

catch-effort mod-

els for three vessel size groups are estimated,

and their

results are compared to those obtained from the industry
analysis.
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fishing more days>.
The resultant estimate of the catch-effort model
based on data for 1968-1985 is:

(5)

Ct= 111.27 Eff"ort·

57

t-·''Ct-,'·'°Ct-a-·

7

"

where effort is the composite input obtained in equation
(4),

t i s time,

and Ct-,

preceding years.
will

and Ct-a

are catches in the two

A positive coefficient

implies that catch

increase as the value of the associated variable in

increased and the values of all other variables are held
constant; a negative coefficient implies that catch will
decrease as the value of the associated variable increase.
Consider restricting total days-at-sea from the 1985
level of 17,837 days to the 1978 level of 9 7 927 days.

The

corresponding total effort decreases from 238.37 to 187.32
standardized days; catch declines from 35 7 812 metric tons
of whole scallops to 30,612 tons or 14.5 p~rcent.

However,

the same level of standardized effort can be maintained by
substituting or augmenting labor for days; the required
rate of increase is approximately one man per boat

(i.e.,

going from an average crew size of 9 to 10 men per vessel).

Subfleet analysis:
Unfortunately,
fleet

an effort restriction across the

ignores the potential

impacts and different responses

by individual vessels of different characteristics (Karpoff,

1987).

That is,

if a
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fleet

is comprised of vessels

with different characteristics (e.g.,

vessel size>,

effects of a

likely vary across

vessels.

uniform restriction will

the

This is illustrated by considering three vessel

classes in which effort restrictions are uniformly imposed.
The three classes are based on size:
51-150 GRT,

and

(3)

<1>

5-50 GRT,

(2)

151 + GRT.

In the preceding analysis,

effort was restricted to
This works out to a

its 1978 level of 9,927 days-at-sea.

uniform restrictions of 59.09 days-at-sea per vessel.
comparision,

In

the number of days-at-sea per boat in 1985,

without restrictions,

Holding the number

was 106.17 days.

of vessels and tonnage constant and applying the 59.09 days
to each vessel
ing total

in the three size classes yields the follow-

levels of effort with restrictions:

GRT--1181.79,

(2) 51-150 GRT--3722.63,

-5022.59 days-at sea.

and

(3)

(1) 5-50
151 + GRl-

The unrestricted number of days-at-

sea during 1985 for the three tonnage classes were 423,
4891,

and 12523 days,

respectively.

It is immediately evi-

dent that the small boat fleet will not be restricted by
the effort restrictions while the large boat fleet will
have effort reduced by more than SO-percent.

In fact,

the

small boat fleet will not experience any restrictions until
total days are restricted to less than 3,553 days or 21
days per vessel given uniform restrictions in terms of
days per boat.
Similar to the industry analysis,

it was determined

that composite inputs could be formed for the three vessel
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classes:

(6)

5-50:

Ee

=

De

(7)

51-150:

Ee

=

Le :a· ••De· s

4

<Ve GRTe

>- :a·

(8)

161 +:

Ee

=

Le a . :a

11

<Ve GRT e

) -

l

•

s •

tS

<Ve GRT e

De .

a

>- • 15 •

l

4

• •

l

4

The two larger vessel classes can increase labor to offset
restrictions on days-at sea; the smaller vessels caY,not
augment other factors to maintain the same level of effort.
Given the restrictions of 3722.63 and 5022.59 days
for the two larger vessel classes,

the same level of effort

caY, be achieved by increasing labor for 9 to 10 and 10 to
11 men per boat,

respectively.

Alternatively,

a one-

percent restrict ion or, the ur-,restricted 1 '985 levels o'f days
at sea will reduce the composite level of effort by 1.56,
.54,

and .2'3 percent,

respectively,

and large boat fleets.

for the srnall,

ri-1edium,

This means that the same level of

e'f'fort before the restrictions can be obained by increasing
labor; this will enable the two larger vessel classes to
harvest the same level o'f catch realized be'fore the
restrictions.

As will be subsequently shown,

it is also

possible 'for the small boat fleet to substitute labor to
maintain the same level of catch; however,

they cannot

maintain the same level o'f e'ffort.
More important,

though,

is how will total catch

respond to the three dif'ferent levels of effort.

The cor-

responding estimated catch-effort models are as follows:
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5-50: C,

=

.000000006LT·

( 10) 51-150: C,

=

493906E, • 6

(11)

=

8. 24Et ·

(9)

151 +: C,

6 9

•

t·

69

t-' ·
911

E,'·
7

•

c,_,. ''C,-a·

0

•t~-~

0

C, -

1 ' · "'~

C, -

Ct - , ' · •"' C, - a - ' ·

0

'

a - • 9 11

0

"'

<Note that a restriction on days cannot be circumvented
with respect to effort for the small boat fleet,
circumvented with respect to catch.

That is,

but can be

if the days-

at-sea restriction is binding for the small boat fleet,
they cannot increase labor to maintain the same level of
effort,

but they can increase labor to maintain the same

level of catch>.
Given no substitution to offset the restriction on
days,

total catch for each t·leet is estimated to decrease

by O (5-50),
Thus,

8.8

(51-150),

and 16.77 (151 +)

percent.

the effort restrictior-, more severely affects the

large boat fleet given no substitution.
The difrerent effects of· restricting days at sea can
also be illustrated by examining the respective output
elasticities or the percentage change in output resulting
from a one-percent decrease ir-, the existing levels of days
at sea.

Based on the industry specification,

decrease in the number of days,
all other factors held constant,

a one-percent

given no substitution and
will result

.23-percent decline in catch (table 1).

in a

ln comparision,

or-,e-percent decrease in days-at-sea wi 11 cause output to
decline 1.66,

.34,

and .2 percent for the small,

and large boat fleet

(table 1>.
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medium,

These declines are based

a

on the condition that days at sea are restricted to less
than their observed levels by one-percent.

Table 1.
Estimated percentage change in catch for a
one-percent reduct ion i r, days-at-sea, 1985
:

Days at sea
Fleet size
Restrictions
Number of
vessels

5-50

Catch 1

:
:
:
:
:

Restrictions

.
None

1-~ drop: None
:

1-~ Days

~-change

423

419

560

551

-1.66

4891

4842

9072

'9041

-.34

+

1252.3

12397

26180

26128

-. 20

Total

17837

17659

35812

.357 .30"

-.23

20

51-150
63

151
85

168

1

Metric ton weight--whole scallops.

•Based on aggregate model; not sum of three models.
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Problems of Imposing Effort Restrictions

The preceding analysis indicates that effort
restrictions imposed on a fleet with different characteristics will have different impacts on various groups of
vessels.

First,

it is possible for a group of vessels to

not be affected by the restrictions if a
is uniformly applied to all vessels.
board restriction on effort will

t·leet restriction

Second,

an across the

impose a different level

of burden for each vessel with different characteristics;
smaller vessels are typically more adversely affected by
these types of restrictions in which effort is uniformly
restricted from its current levels for each vessel class.
Thus,

a major problem of imposing effort restric-

tions is uHow can they be fairly and equitably imposed?"
The answer depends upon how fair is equitable is defined.
This could be in terms of profit,
to the fish stocks.
ity,

net benefits,

revenue,

costs,

or access

Economics would consider profitabiland economic efficiency.

Another preblem is that of factor substitution.
That is,

all three tonnage classes can mitigate the

restrictive nature of days-at-sea restrictions by substituting labor.

Alternatively,

other factors such as elec-

tronics and machinery which were not considered in the
example may be substituted.

For example,

the size of a

dredge may be increased or the ring size decreased.
be possible to increase the towing speed
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lt may

(fuel for days).

On-board capital or equipment may be increased.

The actual

substitution will depend upon the expected changes in
revenues and costs from substitution.
Third,

restrictions on days-at-sea are not the only

form of effort restrictions and they may not adequately
control mortality on juvenil scallops.

It may be necessary

to consider restrictions on days-at-sea,
time of year
Last,
additional

(i.e,

gear,

area,

and

passive controls}.

overall effort restrictions may required

limitations on the number and size of vessels.

If eY,try is possible,

it may be necessary to continuously

adjust the effort restriction in response to possible
increased overall effort.

Alternatively,

some vessels may

be forced out of the fishery if new vessels are more
efficient than the existing vessels.

Summary and Conclusions

The eventual objective of effort restrictions is to
maintain or enhance the level of the exploitable fish
stock.

In simple terms,

the present level of effort is

restricted to either allow future stocks to be constant or
to increase in size with respect to the present size of the
fish stock.

Active or direct restrictions,

however,

fail to adequately control the age of capture,
cern for the scallop fishery,
spatial,
Moreover,

may

a major con-

unless accompanyiy,g passive,

and/or temporal restrictions are also imposed.
implementation of effort restrictions may require
-13-

additional consideration oF diFferent classes of Fishing
vessels if equity is of' coy,cern.

Last,

restrictions

restrictions on components of effort may require restrict ions on other f·actors used to harvest fish if factor substitution is possible.
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